Justice Clarence Thomas accused the Supreme Court on Tuesday of abandoning its constitutional duty after the majority refused to hear Florida's lawsuit alleging that California and Washington illegally issued commercial driver's licenses to illegal immigrants who cannot read English road signs, a policy Thomas linked directly to fatal highway crashes.
Thomas, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, argued the Court had no right to turn the case away. Florida filed its complaint under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the only legal avenue available when one state sues another. By declining to hear it, Thomas wrote in his dissent, the Court left Florida with nowhere else to go.
The case centers on a straightforward claim: federal law requires commercial driver's license applicants to pass a driving test, demonstrate sufficient understanding of English, and show lawful immigration status. Florida alleged that California and Washington issued CDLs in violation of all three requirements, and that the consequences of those decisions traveled across state lines.
Thomas did not mince words about the stakes. In his dissent, he wrote:
"An illegal alien who cannot read English road signs cannot drive an 80,000-pound tractor-trailer."
The case arrived at the Court against the backdrop of a fatal crash on a Florida highway involving Harjinder Singh, a truck driver who held CDLs from both California and Washington. Fox News reported that Singh "could not read the road signs." The specific date and casualty count of the Florida crash were not detailed in court filings referenced in the reporting.
Bodycam footage from a separate incident showed Singh during a July 3, 2025, traffic stop in New Mexico, where he was cited for speeding. That video drew renewed attention to how Singh obtained commercial licenses from two states despite the federal requirements Thomas cited.
Thomas framed the legal question in blunt terms. Federal law and regulations, he wrote, "prohibit States from providing commercial driver's licenses to applicants unless they pass a driver's test, sufficiently understand the English language, and show appropriate immigration status." California and Washington, in his telling, simply ignored those mandates.
The heart of Thomas's dissent was not just about trucking safety. It was about the structure of the federal system itself. When states entered the Union, Thomas argued, they surrendered the right to resolve disputes with other states through other means. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction exists precisely because there is no other court where Florida can bring this kind of claim.
"If this Court does not exercise jurisdiction over a controversy between two States, then the complaining State has no judicial forum in which to seek relief."
Thomas went further, invoking a principle he said the Court had long recognized but now abandoned. He quoted an earlier standard: "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."
The majority's decision to pass on the case, Thomas wrote, reflected a troubling pattern. The Court, he argued, had "adopted a discretionary approach to its exclusive original jurisdiction based on policy judgments that are in conflict with the policy choices that Congress made in the statutory text." In plain English: the justices substituted their own preferences for what the law actually says.
That accusation carries weight coming from Thomas, who has long pressed the Court to follow statutory text rather than institutional convenience. The Court faces a crowded docket of consequential cases this term, and Thomas's willingness to publicly challenge his colleagues signals frustration with how the majority manages its caseload.
The policy dispute at the center of the case is not abstract. California and Washington, Florida alleged, handed CDLs to individuals who lacked lawful immigration status and could not demonstrate English proficiency, two requirements embedded in federal commercial licensing law. Those licenses then allowed drivers to operate heavy trucks on highways far from the states that issued them.
Singh's case illustrates the downstream risk. He held CDLs from two states, was involved in a fatal crash in Florida, and was later stopped in New Mexico. The federal government itself acknowledged the problem. The Transportation Department scrutinized CDL issuance last summer following several deadly crashes involving illegal immigrant truck drivers.
Last September, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy announced new rules imposing stricter criteria for non-citizens seeking commercial licenses. Duffy also threatened to pull federal funding from California for keeping CDLs active for individuals the Trump administration had found ineligible.
A Transportation Department spokesperson laid out the administration's position plainly:
"Secretary Duffy is laser-focused on restoring integrity to America's trucking industry by ensuring truck drivers on our roadways are qualified and vetted. The Department is going after every link in the chain to root out bad actors, fraudsters and chameleon carriers who put American families at risk."
The federal executive branch, in other words, agrees with Florida's complaint. The question Thomas raised is why the judicial branch refused to act on it.
Thomas's dissent raises a structural problem that extends well beyond trucking. If one state's policies create safety risks that spill into another state, and the Supreme Court declines to hear the dispute, what remedy does the injured state have? Thomas's answer: none.
The Constitution channels interstate disputes to the Supreme Court for a reason. States cannot sue each other in lower federal courts under original jurisdiction claims of this kind. They cannot negotiate as sovereign nations. The Court is the forum, or there is no forum at all. Thomas argued that the majority's refusal to hear the case amounted to a denial of the constitutional bargain states made when they joined the Union.
That argument has implications far beyond CDL policy. The Trump administration has brought other major constitutional questions to the Court, and the willingness of the justices to engage, or decline, shapes the boundaries of federal power and state accountability alike.
Neither California nor Washington's responses to Florida's allegations were included in the reporting. That silence is itself notable. The states that issued the licenses have not, at least publicly, defended the specific practices Florida challenged.
Thomas and Alito stood alone in dissent. The rest of the Court, including justices appointed by presidents of both parties, declined to take the case without published explanation. That split is worth noting. Thomas did not merely disagree with the outcome. He accused the majority of making "policy judgments" that override the text Congress wrote.
The Court has seen sharp public exchanges between justices in recent months over how it manages its docket and emergency orders. Thomas's dissent in the Florida case fits that pattern, a justice willing to say publicly that the institution is failing to do its job.
Meanwhile, the executive branch has moved where the Court would not. Duffy's new CDL rules and funding threats represent an attempt to solve the problem through administrative action. But administrative rules can be challenged, delayed, or reversed. A Supreme Court ruling on whether states must comply with federal CDL standards would have carried far more weight.
Florida asked the Court to enforce a straightforward federal requirement: that states not hand commercial trucking licenses to people who cannot read road signs and lack lawful immigration status. The Court said no. Thomas said the Constitution required otherwise. And the 80,000-pound trucks keep rolling.
Tensions between the political branches and the Court are nothing new this term. But this case is different in one respect: the people bearing the cost of the Court's inaction are not politicians or lawyers. They are drivers on American highways, sharing the road with trucks operated by individuals who, by the federal government's own standards, should never have been licensed.
When the highest court in the land refuses to enforce the law Congress wrote, it is not judicial restraint. It is abdication.